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The Fragmentation of Reputation
Bose, Gautam - 2008
This paper investigates the use of reputation in an economy where principals hire agents for two different kinds of … acquire some information on the past behavior of her current agent. This allows consideration of two different reputation … information about past defections is available separately for each task. The two kinds of reputation can be interpreted as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048046
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Something to Prove : Reputational Incentives in Teams
Bar-Isaac, Heski - 2012
reputation cannot credibly commit to exerting effort when working alone. However, by hiring and working with juniors of uncertain … reputation, seniors will have incentives to exert effort. Incentives for young agents arise from a concern for their own … reputation (and the opportunity to take over the firm) but older agents work for the reputation of their firms (and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028000
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
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Dynamic contracting with long-term consequences : optimal CEO compensation and turnover
Vasama, Suvi - 2016
We examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the manager in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550469
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Rewarding Mediocrity? Optimal Regulation of R&D Markets with Reputation Concerns
Chen, Chia-Hui - 2017
counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960359
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(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
Deb, Rahul; Mitchell, Matthew F.; Pai, Mallesh M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 763-800
Motivated by markets for ''expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273779
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Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns
Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017
counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886
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Repeated Delegation
Lipnowski, Elliot - 2020
In an ongoing relationship of delegated decision making, a principal consults a biased agent to assess projects' returns. In equilibrium, the principal allows future bad projects to reward fiscal restraint, but cannot commit to indefinite rewards. We characterize equilibrium payoffs (at fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856367
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When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
Major, Iván - 2013
Governments must usually take policy decisions with an imperfect knowledge of the economic actors' type or the actors' effort level. These issues are addressed within the framework of classic adverse selection or moral hazard models. I discuss in this paper how would the government’s and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955