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Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information : Technical Appendix

Prescott, Edward S. - 2012

This paper proves the Welfare Theorems and the existence of a competitive equilibrium for the club economies with private information in Prescott and Townsend (2005). The proofs cover lottery economies with a finite number of goods and without free disposal. A mapping based on Negishi (1960) is used

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096990

Regulation Under External Credit Constraints : Theoretical Analysis and a CGE Illustration

Chisari, Omar; Quesada, Lucia - 2007

We investigate the interactions between optimal regulation and external credit constraints. When part of a regulated …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014050786

Incentives and the Core of an exchange economy: A survey

Forges, Françoise; Minelli, Enrico; Vohra, Rajiv - 2000

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and interim stage. The analysis includes issues of non-emptiness of the core as well as core...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318870

Markets and contracts

Bisin, A - 2001

Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit modeling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts; this is in common with economies with default, incomplete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318960

Moral Hazard and Efficiency in General Equilibrium with Anonymous Trading

Acemoglu, Daron - 2010

A "folk theorem" originating, among others, in the work of Stiglitz maintains that competitive equilibria area always or "generically" inefficient (unless contracts directly specify consumption levels as in Prescott and Townsend, thus bypassing trading in anonymous markets). This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144184

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty

McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 2003

In McLean and Postlewaite (2002), we analyzed pure exchange economies with asymmetrically informed agents. We defined a notion of informational size and showed that, when the aggregate information of all agents resolves nearly all the uncertainty regarding the state of nature, the conflict...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014089832

A Contest Model of a Professional Sports League with Two-Sided Markets

Dietl, Helmut M.; Duschl, Tobias; Franck, Egon P.; … - 2010

This paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network externalities by integrating the theory of two …-sided markets into a contest model. In professional team sports, the competition of the clubs functions as a platform that enables … sponsors to interact with fans. In these club-mediated interactions, positive network effects operate from the fan market to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014201434

Noisy Arrow-Debreu equilibria

Malamud, Semyon - 2015

I develop a noisy rational expectations equilibrium model with a continuum of states and a full set of options that render the market complete. I show a major difference in equilibrium behaviour between models with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and non-CARA preferences. First, when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296088

The impact of heterogeneous signals on stock price predictability in a rational expectations model

Winter, Christoph - 2018

Through extending a standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) noisy rational expectations economy by a heterogeneous signal structure with signal-specific differences in uncertainty, we show that price momentum as well as reversal are not intrinsically at odds with rational behavior. Differences in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011952636

Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information

Prescott, Edward S. - 2012

Using private information and club theories, this paper develops a theory of firms in general equilibrium. Firms are defined to be assignments of technologies and agents to clubs. In equilibrium, firms form endogenously and multiple types may co-exist. We formulate the general equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013102309

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