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Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
Ehlers, Lars H.; Westkamp, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1009-1042
-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937252
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An impossibility theorem in matching problems
Takagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2006
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332209
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Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Games and economic behavior 82 (2013), pp. 1-14
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239068
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Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - In: International journal of game theory 50 (2021) 1, pp. 105-118
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499788
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Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment : three impossibility results
Nesterov, Alexander - 2014
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010438227
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Two-Sided Strategy-Proofness in Many-to-Many Matching Markets
Romero-Medina, Antonio - 2020
, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching …We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854197
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An impossibility theorem in matching problems
Takagi, Shohei (contributor);  … - 2006
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003397473
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House allocation with overlapping agents: A dynamic mechanism design approach
Kurino, Morimitsu - 2009
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A student is a newcomer in the beginning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267121
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House Allocation with Overlapping Agents: A DynamicMechanism Design Approach
Kurino, Morimitsu - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, inthe case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move inand graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A studentis a \newcomer" in the beginning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022173
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Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Hashimoto, Tadashi; Hirata, Daisuke; Kesten, Onur; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 253-277
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684921