assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the … monetary incentives. We also show that the principal benefits from having a socially-attentive agent and how she optimally …

efficiency. However, fully efficient incentives are achievable if the firm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and …

Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This …

I study the role of financial incentives as signals of job characteristics when these are unknown to potential … incentives on candidates' perception of a brand-new health-promoter position in Uganda and on the resulting size and composition … the community and discourage agents with strong prosocial preferences from applying. While higher financial incentives …

Employees often learn about their ability while working, and the resulting beliefs interact with pay incentives to … job, dynamic selection, effort, and variation in pay incentives. The empirical analysis is based on unique data from a US … which pay incentives affect employment outcomes, profits, and compensation. Under the implemented and the profit …

This paper seeks to explore how an agent's incentives to perform influences her performance. We analyze this question … show that the relationship between the incentives to perform and the expected performance could be negative. The paper thus … offers a novel, non-behavioral explanation for the failure of incentives …

incentives to affect these choices. It develops a multi-task model where employees makes choices between their assigned standard … tasks, for which the firm has a performance measure and provides incentives, and privately observed innovation opportunities …-powered incentives for standard tasks to encourage more innovation, yet in equilibrium employees undertake too few innovation. The …

In this paper, we analyze group incentives when a proportion of agents feel in- equity aversion as defined by Fehr and … show that a tournament provides strong incentives to agents who only care about their own payoff but that it is not …