We study optimal direct mechanisms for a credence goods expert who can be altruistic or spiteful. The expert has private information about her distributional preferences and possibly also about her customer's needs. We introduce a method that allows the customer to offer separate contracts to...

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...

We study the effect of strengthening CACs in a debt rollover model of a sovereign debt crisis. Conditional on default, there are multiple equilibria: the impact of strengthening CACs depends critically on the prevailing equilibrium. For a subset of equilibria, (i) given a fixed number of...

We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention. Their provision alters the optimality criteria in the principal's decision-making, further distorts the mechanism, and may lead to breakdown of contracting in circumstances where...

In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium incentive schemes oÞered to an agent by two principals who can only observe correlated noisy signals of the one-dimensional action taken by the agent. We look at both cases when the two principals can or cannot cooperate in setting the terms of their...

This paper studies an infinite horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to...

We consider a repeated interaction between a manufacturing firm and a subcontractor. The realtionship between the two parties is characterized 1) by moral hazard, 2) by the fact that they do not have perfect knowledge about the base cost level of the project carried out by a subcontractor (the...

We consider a general information design problem in which the task of running a procedure generating information for a continuation game is performed by an agent. A moral hazard roblem therefore emerges in which the principal faces a trade-off between generating information with an eye to the...

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...