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This paper introduces a class of contest models in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. We prove existence and uniqueness of a...
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We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950459
We model competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, each group's performance equals the best effort ("best shot") of its members, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. At the symmetric equilibrium of symmetric contests, increasing the number of...
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We experimentally investigate how reputational concerns affect behavior in repeated Tullock contests by comparing expenditures of participants interacting in fixed groups with the expenditures of participants interacting with randomly changing opponents. When participants receive full...
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We investigate optimal favoritism using identity-contingent prizes in a two-player Tullock model. Besides the usual balance effect, prize allocation has an extra efficiency effect: One additional unit of prize tends to induce more effort, if it is used as the winning prize for the stronger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013238191
Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games and Economic Behavior, 1997) have provided useful conditions for the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010208517
We study the efficiency of standard auctions with interdependent values in which one of two bidders is perfectly informed of his value while the other is partially informed. The second-price auction, as well as English auction, has a unique ex-post equilibrium that yields efficient allocation....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990803