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Auctions for social lending : a theoretical analysis

Chen, Ning; Ghosh, Arpita; Lambert, Nicolas - In: Games and economic behavior 86 (2014), pp. 367-391

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304973

Reputational bidding

Giovannoni, Francesco; Makrēs, Miltiadēs - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362561

Horizontal mergers with synergies : cash vs. profit-share auctions

Ding, Wei; Fan, Cuihong; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: International journal of industrial organization 31 (2013) 5, pp. 382-391

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010247687

Optimal bid disclosure in license auctions with downstream interaction

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2014

The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning …, partial, and no disclosure of bids, which correspond to standard auctions. We show that more information disclosure increases …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010378352

On seller estimates and buyer returns

Gershkov, Alex; Toxvaerd, Flavio - In: Economic theory bulletin 1 (2013) 1, pp. 47-55

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785950

Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions

Bodoh-Creed, Aaron - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 6, pp. 2436-2466

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257925

Auctions with contingent payments : an overview

Skrzypacz, Andrzej - In: International journal of industrial organization 31 (2013) 5, pp. 666-675

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010248411

Revealing information in auctions : the optimal auction versus the second-price auction

Arefeva, Alina; Meng, Delong - In: Economics letters 204 (2021), pp. 1-4

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012607810

Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type

Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013

If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781360

When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions

Carrasco, Vinicius; Orenstein, Paulo; Salgado, Pablo - In: Journal of mathematical economics 62 (2016), pp. 52-61

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011664891

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