conveys full information about the quality of the good to uninformed buyers. Deceiving the uninformed buyers by charging a … high price and mimicking a high quality is not profitable when the competitive fringe is large enough. Since a higher price …

monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on …

We present a diagrammatic and step-by-step analysis of price signaling quality. Because quality is a continuum on the … equilibrium. We first study the behavior of the monopoly when price conveys information about quality. We then show the effect of …

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer …

Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If … the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the … performance of both products. We show that if the probability that low quality will be detected is in an intermediate range, the …

' behavior and firms' incentives to upgrade product quality in markets where information is traditionally limited. I first build … a model of consumer search with firms' endogenous quality decisions. In this model, lower search costs reallocate demand … toward higher-quality producers, raising firms' incentives to upgrade quality, and more so for firms selling ex-ante lower-quality …

Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce he information … gap, consumers can rely on standards (e.g., certification) that ensure quality and origin of the goods. These costly … standards can be adopted by a group of producers of high-quality goods. We study the formation of such a group that we model as …

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer …

analyze whether signaling works in the German market for insurance intermediation services. For this a signal must increase … service quality and be easily identifiable by consumers so that it pays for intermediaries to spend the related costs. By … using OLS and logit estimations we test whether intermediary type, reputational activities and a variety of signaling …

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer … acquisition ; inspection ; lemons ; middlemen ; signaling …