In this paper, we examine the consequences of imperfect information on the pattern of transfers from parents to children. Drawing on the theory of mechanism design, we consider a model of family contract with two levels of effort. We prove that equal transfers among children are expected under...

What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the...

We conduct the first empirical economic investigation of the decision to cheat by university students. We investigate student demand for essays, using hypothetical discrete choice experiments in conjunction with consequential Holt–Laury gambles to derive subjects’ risk preferences....

This paper uses a principal-agent model to investigate how public school managers react to government incentives based on previous school performance. Using data from the Brazilian Student Evaluation Exam (Prova Brasil - PB) and the School Census, we estimate a managerial effort function by...

This paper uses a principal-agent model to investigate how public school managers react to government incentives based on previous school performance. Using data from the Brazilian Student Evaluation Exam (Prova Brasil -- PB) and the School Census, we estimate a managerial effort function by...