Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin's theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo's type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nashimplementable social choice...

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all...

The paper proposes necessary and sufficient conditions for the natural implementation of (efficient) social choice correspondences (SCCs) in pure finite exchange economies when some of the agents are partially honest. A partially honest agent is an agent who strictly prefers to tell the truth...

We study the relationship between two-agent implementation problems and the notionof interim efficiency due to Holmström and Myerson (1983) in Bayesian environmentswith private values and independent types. We present a general property, Bayesianefficiency, and show that it is sufficient for...