A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara

Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin's theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo's type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nashimplementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) by mechanisms with the strategy space reduction, which is further shown to be equivalent to the class of Nash-implementable SCCs

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Year of publication:	2010-04
Authors:	Lombardi, Michele ; Yoshihara, Naoki
Publisher:	Tokyo : Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Subject:	Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (11 S., 237 Kb)
Series:	Discussion paper series / A / Institute of Economic Research. - Tōkyō, ZDB-ID 2176058-5.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Discussion paper series. A ; No. a538 Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10086/18497 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008653613