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We investigate the provision of public capital in an endogenous growth model with asymmetric information. In a credit market with costly screening, we show that the equilibrium contracts are characterized by the self-selection of borrowers. Through identifying an additional adverse effect of...
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substantial welfare gains are possible, examples show that i) technology transfer may be futile if a "regularity" condition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055272
. Such coordination may not enhance welfare. If groups are symmetric except for group size, players in the smaller group bid …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919088
We reconsider Laussel and Palfrey's (2003) analysis of private provision of a discrete public good via the subscription game. We show that the equilibria they define as semi-regular do not exist. Taking players' values for the public good as uniformly distributed on [vl, vh] with vl 0, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014050790
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We examine the optimal financing of infrastructure when governments have limited financial commitment and can … expropriate rents from private sector firms that manage infrastructure. While private firms need incentives to implement projects … investors to fund infrastructure projects. Optimal financing involves government guarantees to investors against project failure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334350
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We analyze a symmetric Bayesian game in which two players individually contribute to fund a discrete public good; contributions are refunded if they do not meet a threshold set by the seller of the good. We provide a general characterization of symmetric equilibrium strategies that are continuous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012726475
In this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no mechanism which is efficient, strategy-proof and where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011958