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Macro shocks and costly political action in non-democracies

Dorsch, Michael; Dunz, Karl; Maarek, Paul - In: Public Choice 162 (2015) 3, pp. 381-404

<Para ID="Par1">This paper presents a theory of political instability in autocracies where the disenfranchised express … shocks may trigger costly political action when the autocrat chooses to create rents through regulation that deteriorates the … the magnitude of the effect depends on the extent to which business regulation is market-distorting. Copyright Springer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011241859

Development and inefficient regulation under the threat of revolution

Dorsch, Michael; Dunz, Karl; Maarek, Paul - In: Journal of comparative economics : the journal of the … 44 (2016) 4, pp. 1040-1054

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771222

Would you trust lobbies?

Fauvet, Pierre; Rouillon, Sébastien - In: Public choice 167 (2016) 3/4, pp. 201-219

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011659079

Contests : a comparison of timing and information structures

Ludwig, Sandra - 2011

We study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents. We consider four institutional settings: Contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information. We find that an effort-maximizing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124645

Rent-seeking contests under symmetric and asymmetric information

Wasser, Cédric - 2010

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...