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Quality communication via cheap-talk messages in experimental auctions
Lee, Jaesun; Shapiro, Dmitry - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 212 (2023), pp. 74-107
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014472102
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Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games
Lichtig, Avi; Weksler, Ran - In: Journal of economic theory 210 (2023), pp. 1-22
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422575
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Cheap-talk disclosure of negative information and risk-averse buyers
Shapiro, Dmitry; Huh, Seung - In: Seoul journal of economics : SJE 34 (2021) 3, pp. 365-392
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012619837
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Optimal Strategic Communication : Can a Less Informed Expert Be More Informative?
Ivanov, Maxim G. - 2006
This paper investigates an extended version of Crawford-Sobel's (1982) communication game in which the principal can …-Sobel's most informative equilibrium and optimal delegation. We then study multi-stage communication. This modification results in … truth-telling communication at every stage. Finally, we construct a mechanism in which approximately full information is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059602
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Full revelation of expertise before disclosure
Li, Run - In: Economics letters 221 (2022), pp. 1-5
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014229526
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Persuasion and receiver's news
Ispano, Alessandro - In: Economics letters 141 (2016), pp. 60-63
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011616112
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Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge
Kurschilgen, Michael; Marcin, Isabel - In: Games and economic behavior 113 (2019), pp. 651-672
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012174535
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Disclosure of information
Great Britain / Commission on Industrial Relations - 1972
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000327400
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Constrained Persuasion with private information
Kosenko, Andrew - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 23 (2023) 1, pp. 345-370
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013555588
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Advice Is Cheap : Information Is Not!
Häfner, Samuel - 2018
An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the state of a project prior to investing in it. For a given level of investment, a good project succeeds with higher probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932515