This paper presents a model in which fund managers choose between active management and passive management when investors cannot directly observe managers' efforts and skills. In an equilibrium skilled managers actively manage their funds only when skills can add a large value in active...

The problem of optimally designing information for multiple agents who interact in a game can be formulated as a linear program. We explore its dual representation and show that it provides a novel perspective and new economic insights into the information-design problem. Through the lens of the...

This paper addresses the question of multi-party computation in a model with asymmetric information. Each agent has a private value (secret), but in contrast to standard models, the agent incurs a cost when retrieving the secret. There is a social choice function the agents would like to compute...

This paper studies implementation in settings where agents take strategic actions that influence preferences. We show that such settings can arise in entry auctions for markets, and that the Vickery-Clarke-Groves Mechanism is not guaranteed to be truthful because of strategic actions. We thus...