This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...

This paper addresses the question of multi-party computation in a model with asymmetric information. Each agent has a private value (secret), but in contrast to standard models, the agent incurs a cost when retrieving the secret. There is a social choice function the agents would like to compute...

We analyze consumer demand behavior using Dynamic Random Utility Model (DRUM). Under DRUM, a consumer draws a utility function from a stochastic utility process in each period and maximizes this utility subject to her budget constraint. DRUM allows unrestricted time correlation and cross-section...

A crucial aspect behind rational decision making in an economic game is the availability of complete information. Democratic elections can be modelled as one such game, where the electorate and candidates are competing players. In the democratic game, the electorate suffers from asymmetry of...