We examine how performance management practices that render employee accomplishments transparent in an organization depend on employees’ hierarchical level. We consider a principal-agent model of an organization where the principal contracts directly with a group of higher-level agent-workers...

"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...

An essential ingredient in models of career concerns is ex ante uncertainty about an agent's type. This paper shows how career concerns can arise even in the absence of any such ex ante uncertainty, if the unobservable actions that an agent takes influence his future productivity. By...

Die Sonderfrage im zweiten Quartal 2014 thematisiert die Folgen der neuen Regelungen zur Rente mit 63 in den Unternehmen. Der Beitrag stellt die Ergebnisse dieser Befragungen vor.

Das ifo Institut befragt im Auftrag und in Kooperation von Randstad vierteljährlich Personalleiter in mehr als 1 000 Unternehmen nach der Bedeutung von verschiedenen Flexibilisierungsinstrumenten. Zudem werden in jedem Quartal Sonderfragen zu aktuellen personalpolitischen Themen gestellt. Im...

We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully...

We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully...

In this paper the author presents a general assessment of the labour market situation of older workers in the Czech Republic, starting with a more general overview of the demographic situation and emphasizing the generational differences among the young-old and older cohorts, underlying a number...

We introduce uncertainty into Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to study optimal long-term contracting with learning. In a dynamic relationship, the agent's shirking not only reduces current performance but also increases the agent’s information rent due to the persistent belief manipulation...