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by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding …-out if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled …. -- extrinsic and intrinsic motivation ; crowding-out ; intention-based reciprocity ; incomplete information ; hidden costs of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009272298
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Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of communication, by addressing the questions of (i) asymmetric communication and (ii) the endogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970700
Costless pre-play communication has been shown to effectively facilitate within-group coordination. However, in competitive coordination games, such as rent-seeking contests, better within-group coordination leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency. We report an experiment in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029381
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571
self-interested players would not voluntarily engage in any transaction, unless they expect trust and reciprocity to play a … surplus obtained, so the trustor cannot tell if a low back-payment corresponds to a low or a high level of reciprocity. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014094946
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632
information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive-compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satises … an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all ecient social … agents have private information about their material payo types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444226
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