Showing 1 - 10 of 20,355
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532231
´s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011512984
unfairness provides the expressive benefit of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage … strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009552914
of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009755226
The consequences of strike pay for employees and of an employers' strike insurance fund are analysed in a two …-period screening model of labour disputes with private information of the firm. It is shown that the employers' strike fund reduces … uncertainty and hence lowers strike activity. If the union's strike pay fund can incur a deficit during disputes, strike pay will …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151126
unfairness provides the expressive benefit of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage … strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014168651
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003256856
We develop a signaling model of final offer arbitration (FOA) in which the informed party makes the final settlement demand to the uninformed party. In FOA, each party submits a proposal to an arbitrator and if no agreement is reached, the arbitrator must select one of the two submitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013246967
In Final Offer Arbitration, both parties submit a proposal to an arbitrator. In the event the parties cannot reach a negotiated settlement, the arbitrator chooses the submitted proposal that is closest to her preferred settlement. In such a model, asymmetric information can lead to costly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012830040
We identify two features of final offer arbitration (FOA) which may impede settlement in a bargaining game where asymmetric information drives the failure to settle. First, under FOA the informed party has an incentive not to voluntarily reveal private information. Revealing this information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151662