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This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organisation where there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques à la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we...
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In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity. The second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263051
This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is contractible. We consider an organization that should take two decisions, affected by a common state of the world parameter only known by the agent. We show that, if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263055
In this paper we consider the problem of regulating an open access essential facility. A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market under the roof of a regulatory mechanism. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both competitors use...
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