Organizational theory suggests that authority should lie in the hands of those with information, yet the power to transfer authority is rarely absolute in practice. We investigate the validity and application of this advice in a model of optimal contracting between an uninformed principal and...

We study a dynamic agency model where the agent privately observes the firm's cash flows that are subject to persistent shocks. We characterize the policy dynamics and implement the optimal contract by financial securities. Because bad performance distorts investors' beliefs downward, the agent...

Increasingly, lobbying groups are subject to transparency requirements, obliging them to provide detailed information about their business. We study the effect this transparency policy has on the nature of lobbying competition. Under mild conditions, mandated transparency leads to an increase in...

Recommended readings (Machine generated): Michael R. Baye and John Morgan (2001), 'Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets', American Economic Review, 91 (3), June, 454-74 -- Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2003), 'Platform Competition...