We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We …

We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We …

elicited data. As an illustration, the methodology is applied to a double auction experiment, where traders' beliefs about the …

informed of his value while the other is partially informed. The second-price auction, as well as English auction, has a unique … ex-post equilibrium that yields efficient allocation. By contrast, the first-price auction has no efficient equilibrium …

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed … auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting …, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction …

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed … auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting …, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction …

In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …

heterogeneity in the dispersion of private value components. I use the asymmetric ascending auction model of Hong and Shum (2003) to …

novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational … of insider information the call auction performs worse than continuous double auction. Testing these hypotheses in the … lab we find that insider information increases informational efficiency of call auction prices but does not decrease the …