affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than … under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts. …

We study information aggregation with a biased election organizer who recruits voters at some cost. Voters are …. In contrast to existing results for large elections, there are equilibria in which information aggregation fails: As the …

Which decision rule should we use to make a binary collective choice? While voting procedures are applied ubiquitously … qualified majority voting. Our result shows that using a VCG mechanism is not superior to voting in general and justifies the … use of voting mechanisms. It thereby could explain why many decision rules employed in practice do not rely on monetary …

political phenomena that ensued is presented. In the case of sophisticated voting over certain kinds of binary agendas, such as … sometimes yield “sophisticated sincerity”, where equilibrium voting behavior is indistinguishable from sincere voting. Under … behave leads to probabilistic voting models that typically yield utilitarian outcomes. Uncertainty among the voters over …

desirable policies and aim at manipulating information aggregation by misrepresenting their private information. We show that … private information truthfully before voting takes place. Depending on the distance between two feasible public good levels …, the optimal mechanism involves either one or two voting rounds. We show that procedural efficiency cannot be achieved by …