This paper considers a two-player game where each player chooses a resource from a finite collection of options. Each resource brings a random reward. Both players have statistical information regarding the rewards of each resource. Additionally, there exists an information asymmetry where each...

We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if the contributions are at least as great as the cost of production. We...

Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin's theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo's type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nash-implementable social choice...

Every mixed strategy equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a monotone pure strategy equilibrium in asymmetric first-price auctions in which n bidders have affiliated, one-dimensional, atomless types and interdependent values

Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state-independent. We show that only the babbling equilibrium survives the introduction of any small...

Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play...