Showing 1 - 10 of 10
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009775544
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856702
We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A privately informed receiver chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism that can condition the information disclosed to the receiver on the receiver's report about his type. We establish the equivalence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963449
A sender chooses ex ante how her information will be disclosed to a privately informed receiver who then takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. The sender faces an ex ante quantity-quality tradeoff: sending positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007350
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273762
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011583422
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011791640
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011783242
We consider a standard persuasion problem in which the receiver’s action and the state of the world are both one-dimensional. Fully characterizing optimal signals when utilities are non-linear is a daunting task. Instead, we develop a general approach to understanding a key qualitative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031929
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478071