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In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199808
The matter studied here is how, and with what implications, people may decide that they do not want to be let into secrets that concern them. They could get the information at no cost but they refuse to know. The reasoning is framed in terms of principals and agents, with the principals assumed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206131
A crucial aspect behind rational decision making in an economic game is the availability of complete information. Democratic elections can be modelled as one such game, where the electorate and candidates are competing players. In the democratic game, the electorate suffers from asymmetry of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082196
Informed voters are believed to be necessary for the well-functioning of elections. However, the puzzle is raised: Why are voters and politicians becoming more polarized despite the increased availability of information? We consider an election with policy-motivated candidates and partially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347676
In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665138
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724330
In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008669935
In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746679
We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in committees, where members can have both common and conflicting interests. In the presence of public information, the simple and efficient vote-your-signal strategy profile no longer constitutes an equilibrium under the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729095
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct candidate wins goes to one as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. This paper studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671890