We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome while the mechanism must be implementable in dominant …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome while the mechanism must be implementable in dominant …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome, while the mechanism must be strategyproof. We identify …

We consider the problem faced by a procurement agency that runs a mechanism for constructing an assortment of … differentiated products with posted prices, from which heterogeneous consumers buy their most preferred alternative. Procurement … take this form. When choosing the assortment, the procurement agency must optimize the tradeoff between offering a richer …

For a repeated procurement problem, we compare two stylized negotiating cultures which differ in how the buyer uses an … entrant to exert pressure on the incumbent resembling U.S. style and Japanese style procurement. In each period, the suppliers … are privately informed about their production cost, but only the incumbent can influence the buyer s procurement mechanism …

profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility … participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome, while the mechanism must be strategyproof. We identify …

We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable … effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …

We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable … effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …