Similar Search Results - EconBiz

Auctions, bidding and exchange design

Kalagnanam, Jayant; Parkes, David C. - In: Handbook of quantitative supply chain analysis : …, (pp. 143-212). 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002233775

Winner determination algorithms for electronic auctions: a framework design

Bichler, Martin; Kalagnanam, Jayant; Lee, Ho Soo; Lee, … - In: E-commerce and web technologies : third international …, (pp. 37-46). 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003518336

Using Linear Programming in a Business-to-Business Auction Mechanism

Dawande, Milind; Chandrashekaran, Ramaswamy; … - 2002

Business to business interactions are largely centered around contracts for procurement or for distribution. Negotiations and sealed bid tendering are the most common techniques used for price discovery and generating the terms and conditions for contracts. Sealed bid tenders collect bids (that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014113331

Multi-item Vickrey : Dutch auctions

Mishra, Debasis; Parkes, David C. - In: Games and economic behavior 66 (2009) 1, pp. 326-347

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003852754

Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

Mishra, Debasis; Parkes, David C. - In: Journal of economic theory 132 (2007) 1, pp. 335-366

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003407404

Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions

Harsha, Pavithra; Barnhart, Cynthia; Parkes, David C.; … - In: Computers & operations research : and their … 37 (2010) 7, pp. 1271-1284

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003945045

Testing a purportedly more learnable auction mechanism

Milkman, Katherine L.; Burns, James; Parkes, David C.; … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003722751

Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

Mishra, Debasis (contributor); Parkes, David C. (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003289443

Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions

Dütting, Paul; Fischer, Felix; Parkes, David C. - In: Mathematics of operations research 44 (2019) 1, pp. 196-211

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001087

Nontruthful position auctions are more robust to misspecification

Dütting, Paul; Fischer, Felix; Parkes, David C. - In: Mathematics of operations research 49 (2024) 2, pp. 901-927

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014564608

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