We analyze the determinants of tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated contest with noise in the contest success function. Sustaining collusion via Nash reversion strategies is easier the more noise there is, and is more difficult the larger is the contest's prize value. An increase in the...

This paper studies competing mechanisms with limited commitment over infinite horizon. Between a mechanism and the agent, there is perfect monitoring, but each mechanism can have arbitrary signals about the interaction between other mechanisms and the agent. I show that if the agent's type is...

This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in multiple component conflicts, commonly termed "battlefields". In multi-battlefield conflicts, behavioral linkages across battlefields depend both on the technologies of conflict within each...

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a...

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the...

This article investigates the impact of the distribution of preferences on equilibrium behavior in conflicts that are modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. In this context, we define centrists and radicals using a willingness-to-pay criterion that admits preferences...