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The genericity of the McAfee-Reny condition for full surplus extraction in models with a continuum of types
Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2015 - This version: July 5, 2015
McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in models with a continuum of types. We interpret their condition as significantly stronger version of the requirement of injectiveness of the function mapping abstract types into beliefs and prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301240
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Distributionally Robust Pricing in Auctions
Suzdaltsev, Alex - 2018
Suppose that in a second-price auction, a seller wishes to set an optimal reserve price, but the information about the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012928146
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The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces
Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin - 2017 - This version: February 8, 2017
McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in naive type spaces with a continuum of payoff types. We generalize their characterization to arbitrary abstract type spaces and to the universal type space and show that in each setting, full...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604046
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Hiding Information in Open Auctions
Ettinger, David - 2012
We analyze the rationale for hiding information in open auction formats. In particular, we focus on the incentives for … aggregating more accurate information that could be gathered by observing the exact drop out values of the exiting bidders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098020
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2016
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013004045
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2015
We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011350
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2015
This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017815
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2016
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992717
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First Price Auctions with General Information Structures : Implications for Bidding and Revenue
Bergemann, Dirk - 2016
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982245
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Self-interest, Social Wealth, and Competition as a Discovery Procedure : A classroom experiment that makes the "invisible hand" visible
Kirstein, Roland; Schmidtchen, Dieter - 2003
In Economics, as in any social science, empirical tests of theoretical results face a problem: researchers are unable to reproduce the whole economy (or at least its relevant parts) in their laboratories. Nowadays, Experimental Economics uses stylized experiments, drawing on the experience of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296887