Suppose that in a second-price auction, a seller wishes to set an optimal reserve price, but the information about the …

We analyze the rationale for hiding information in open auction formats. In particular, we focus on the incentives for … aggregating more accurate information that could be gathered by observing the exact drop out values of the exiting bidders …

This paper explores the consequences of information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and … Bayesian equilibrium for some information structure. In particular, we characterize maximum and minimum revenue across all … information structures when bidders may not know their own values, and maximum revenue when they do know their values. Revenue is …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily … information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders indifferent between …

Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been … bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: As the numbers of winning and losing … bidders grow large, information aggregates if and only if uncertainty about the fraction of winning bidders vanishes. It is …