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This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967
In light of recent developments in auction theory, this Article re-examines Delaware corporate law governing directors' actions when structuring the sale of a corporation. A foundational doctrine of Delaware law is that when the board of directors resolves to sell a corporation, it must obtain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033404
We consider imperfectly discriminating, common-value, all-pay auctions (or contests) where some players know the value of the prize, others do not. We show that if the prize is always of positive value, then all players are active in equilibrium. If the prize is of value zero with positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055053
consumption by rendering brands a signalling device. In a price competition framework, we show that advertising increases …The paper formalizes the intuition that brands are consumed for image reasons and that advertising creates a brand …'s image. The key idea is that advertising informs the public of brand names and creates the possibility of conspicuous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366557
In this paper we undertake an empirical study of advertising in an online auctions market, or, more precisely …, advertising on eBay. The type of advertising that we consider works as follows: at the time of listing the item on eBay, sellers … new bidders, we can estimate the effect of advertising on the number of bidders, the distribution of bidders' valuations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026722
It is commonly assumed in private value auctions that bidders have no information about the realization of the other bidders' valuations. Nevertheless, an informative public signal about the realization may be released by a bidder while he learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293376
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334084
We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for admission to an innovation contest. After the contest,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334102
This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Depending on his valuation, a contestant may have an incentive to bluff or sandbag...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290360
This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Depending on his valuation, a contestant may have an incentive to bluff or sandbag...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003768858