Standard economic models of groundwater management impose restrictive assumptions regarding perfect transmissivity (i.e., the aquifer behaves as a bathtub), no external effects of groundwater stocks, observability of individual extraction rates, and/or homogenous agents. In this article, we...

Standard economic models of groundwater management impose restrictive assumptions regarding perfect transmissivity (i.e., the aquifer behaves as a bathtub), no external effects of groundwater stocks, observability of individual extraction rates, and/or homogenous agents. In this article, we...

Consider the following "structured" procurement problem: A buyer wishes to procure a set of items (e.g., edges of a graph) from multiple suppliers, such that the procured items collectively form a basis of a matroid (e.g., a spanning tree of the graph). Each supplier is capable of supplying one...

Descending mechanisms for procurement (or, ascending mechanisms for selling) have been well‐recognized for their simplicity from the viewpoint of bidders — they require less bidder sophistication as compared to sealed‐bid mechanisms. In this study, we consider procurement under each of two...

A buyer faces a two-dimensional mechanism design problem for awarding a project to one among a set of contractors, each of whom is privately informed about his cost and his estimate of an a priori random non-cost attribute. The winning contractor realizes his non-cost attribute upon the...