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Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2017

establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657364

Mechanism design without quasilinearity

Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 511-544

establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308444

Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences

Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Müller, Rudolf - In: Journal of mathematical economics 70 (2017), pp. 29-35

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011825957

Auction design for the efficient allocation of service capacity under congestion

Barrera, Jorge; Garcia, Alfredo - In: Operations research 63 (2015) 1, pp. 151-165

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010519501

Efficient constrained combinatorial auctions

Lerner, Anat; Gonen, Rica - In: International game theory review 18 (2016) 3, pp. 1-10

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011571602

A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence

Chung, Kim-sau; Olszewski, Wojciech - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 4, pp. 469-487

We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702275