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On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects
Albano, Gian Luigi; Germano, Fabrizio; Lovo, Stefano - 2001
We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608824
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A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies
Albano, Gian Luigi; Germano, Fabrizio; Lovo, Stefano M. - 1999
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001430791
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A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies
Albano, Gian Luigi; Germano, Fabrizio; Lovo, Stefano M. - In: Economics letters 71 (2001) 1, pp. 55-60
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001564097
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On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects
Albano, Gian Luigi; Germano, Fabrizio; Lovo, Stefano M. - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001625333
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On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects
Albano, Gian Luigi; Germano, Fabrizio; Lovo, Stefano M. - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001714425
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Retaliatory equilibria in a Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects
Albano, Gian Luigi; Germano, Fabrizio; Lovo, Stefano M. - In: Review of economic design : RED 10 (2006) 1, pp. 1-8
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003362899
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Ascending auctions for multiple objects : the case for the Japanese design
Albano, Gian Luigi; Germano, Fabrizio; Lovo, Stefano M. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 28 (2006) 2, pp. 331-355
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003329922
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On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects
Albano, Gian-Luigi; Germano, Fabrizio; Lovo, Stefano - 2003
We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034692