Showing 1 - 10 of 10
We analyse pricing, effort and tipping decisions in the online service "Google Answers". While users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, they can additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post. In line with the related experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003833189
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011560976
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489217
Customers at the online music label Magnatune can pay what they want for albums, as long as the payment is within a given price range ($5-$18). Magnatune recommends to pay $8, and on average customers paid $8.20 (Regner and Barria, 2009). We ran an online survey and collected responses from 227...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747635
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011942354
Intentions-based models of social preferences use the framework of psychological games and incorporate higher order beliefs and actions into the utility function. We test the robustness of two types of intentions-based models (guilt aversion and reciprocity). In addition to incentivised...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008689019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198474
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurance) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned, when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530065
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009515366
We analyze reciprocal behavior when moral wiggle room exists. Dana et al. (2007) show that giving in a dictator game is only partly due to distributional preferences as the giving rate drops when situational excuses for selfish behavior are provided. Our binary trust game closely follows their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576929