To what extent was the credit contraction during the global financial crisis due to more intense screening and monitoring by banks? We address this question by analysing changes in the structure of a large number of syndicated loans to private, non-financial corporations. We find an increase in...

To address the challenges posed by global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recommended an "additional loss absorbency requirement" for these institutions. Along these lines, I develop a microfounded design of capital surcharges that target the...

We study bank supervision by combining a theoretical model that distinguishes supervision from regulation and a novel dataset on work hours of Federal Reserve supervisors. We highlight the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of supervision and use the model to interpret the relationship...

We study the efficiency of banking regulation under financial integration. Banks freely choose the jurisdiction where to locate their activities and have private information about their efficiency level. Regulators non-cooperatively offer any regulatory contract that satisfies information and...

This paper focuses on the consequences of cross-border banking and entry of multi-national banks (MNBs) for banking supervision and regulation. When a MNB expands internationally with subsidiaries, the MNB operates under the legislation of several countries - both the home country and the host...

Securitization is a financial innovation that experiences a boom-bust cycle, as many other innovations before. This paper analyzes possible reasons for the breakdown of primary and secondary securitization markets, and argues that misaligned incentives along the value chain are the primary cause...

We show how banks' excessive risk-taking, stemming from informational asymmetries in loan markets, can lead to an excessive output loss when a recession starts. Risk-based capital requirements can alleviate the output loss by reducing excessive risk-taking in ‘normal' times. Model simulations...

Regulators in developing countries may not have access to timely ex-post verifiable information regarding banks' capital or investment decision. This paper examines whether, in such an environment, regulators can enforce capital requirements. Using a model of a relationship between a regulator...

To what extent was the credit contraction during the global financial crisis due to more intense screening and monitoring by banks? We address this question by analyzing changes in the structure of a large number of syndicated loans to private, non-financial corporations. We find an increase in...

This study uses covenant violations to provide evidence on how firms make disclosure decisions in the presence of enhanced bank monitoring. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that firms reduce disclosure following covenant violations. A series of analyses suggest that part of this...