The Role of Bank Monitoring in Borrowers’ Discretionary Disclosure : Evidence from Covenant Violations

This study uses covenant violations to provide evidence on how firms make disclosure decisions in the presence of enhanced bank monitoring. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that firms reduce disclosure following covenant violations. A series of analyses suggest that part of this decline in disclosure reflects a delegation of monitoring to banks by shareholders who consequently demand less disclosure

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Vashishtha, Rahul
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Unternehmenspublizität \| Corporate disclosure \| Bank \| Kreditgeschäft \| Bank lending \| Kredit \| Credit \| Bankenaufsicht \| Banking supervision

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (49 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 31, 2014 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2115637 [DOI]
Classification:	M40 - Accounting and Auditing. General ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065793