We use British household panel data to explore the wage returns to training incidence and intensity (duration) for 6924 employees. We find these returns differ greatly depending on the nature of the training (general or specific); who funds the training (employee or employer); and the skill...

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Auswirkungen der Neuen Ökonomie auf den deutschen Arbeitsmarkt. Neue Berufsfelder weisen nach dieser Untersuchung eine große und zunehmende Bedeutung auf. Gekennzeichnet ist diese Entwicklung durch verstärkte Humankapital- und Flexibilitätsanforderungen...

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Auswirkungen der Neuen Ökonomie auf den deutschen Arbeitsmarkt. Neue Berufsfelder weisen nach dieser Untersuchung eine große und zunehmende Bedeutung auf. Gekennzeichnet ist diese Entwicklung durch verstärkte Humankapital- und Flexibilitätsanforderungen...

Thurow's job-competition model implies that overeducation is contingent upon the differing skill endowments of employees. As yet, only rudimentary evidence has been furnished to confirm this relationship. In the present paper, we test the theory in a more sophisticated manner, by means of a more...

Training by firms is a central means by which workers accumulate human capital, yet firms may be reluctant to provide general training if workers can quit and use their gained skills elsewhere. “Training contracts” that impose a penalty for premature quitting can help alleviate this...

This paper provides a simple theoretical framework based on a new type of human capital introduced by Gibbons and Waldman (2004), called task-specific training, to understand job design. Mainly, in the presence of task-specific training, promotions might result ex-post in the underutilization of...

Firms may be reluctant to provide general training if workers can quit and use their gained skills elsewhere. "Training contracts" that impose a penalty for premature quitting can help alleviate this inefficiency. Using plausibly exogenous contractual variation from a leading trucking firm, we...

Thurow's job-competition model implies that overeducation is contingent upon the differing skill endowments of employees. As yet, only rudimentary evidence has been furnished to confirm this relationship. In the present paper, we test the theory in a more sophisticated manner, by means of a more...

Firms may be reluctant to provide general training if workers can quit and use their gained skills elsewhere. "Training contracts" that impose a penalty for premature quitting can help alleviate this inefficiency. Using plausibly exogenous contractual variation from a leading trucking firm, we...

In this paper we develop a frictionless labor market model in which a firm invests in specific and general training that is neither complement nor substitute to specific training, while the worker invests only in specific training. We use this simple model to show that, contrary to Becker's...