Showing 1 - 10 of 35
We consider a first-price auction when the ranking of bidders' private valuations is common knowledge among bidders. This new informational framework is motivated by several applications, from procurement to privatization. It induces a particular asymmetric auction model with affiliated private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370622
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378243
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011439694
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011439738
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010470994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011644264
We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310173
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310270
This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders' valuations, assuming the symmetric independent private values framework, and risk neutrality. In all these auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310759
Dieser Diskussionsbeitrag kommentiert Güths axiomatische Begründung der Zweit-Preis-Auktion. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auch Güths umfangreiche Analyse der Lambda-Auktion durch eine einfache und anschaulich interpretierbare Lösung ersetzt.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310763