This paper studies the regulation of an airline duopoly on a congested airport. Regulation should then address two market failures: uninternalized congestion, and overpricing due to market power. We find that first-best charges are differentiated over airlines if asymmetric, and completely drive...

This paper studies the second-best problem where not all links of acongested transportation network can be tolled. The second-best taxrule for this problem is derived for general static networks, so thatthe solution presented is valid for any graph of the network, and forany set of tolling...

A dynamic 'car-following' extension of the conventional economic model of traffic congestion is presented, which predicts the average cost function for trips in stationary states to be significantly different from the conventional average cost function derived from the speed-flow function. When...

This paper develops a continuous-time -continuous-place economic model of road trafficcongestion with a bottleneck, based on car-following theory. The model integrates twoarchetype congestion technologies used in the economics literature: 'static flow congestion',originating in the works of...