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Methods for calculating cartel damages: a survey
Doose, Anna Maria - 2013
The paper focuses on the various methods used to quantify cartel damages, which have become more and more important as private damage suits in the aftermath of antitrust litigation increase. The approaches implementation is embedded into current legal environments with regards to the estimation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010230329
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Chapter 15 Antitrust
Kaplow, Louis; Shapiro, Carl - In: Handbook of law and economics : volume 2, (pp. 1073-1225). 2007
This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023495
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Common pool resources : is there support for conservationists?
Ansink, Erik; Weikard, Hans-Peter - 2018
We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011924829
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Governing Cartels as Common Pool Resources
Schmal, W. Benedikt - 2022
through the lens of the `governance of the commons' to study the internal organization of cartels. It highlights the high …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237230
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bidding rings
Asker, John - Palgrave Macmillan
A bidding ring is a collection of bidders who collude in an auction in order to gain greater surplus by depressing competition. This entry describes some typical bidding rings and provides an introduction to the related theoretical and empirical literature.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009395646
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ANTITRUST AGENCIES AND HARD-CORE CARTELS: A GAME THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE
Prof. Xiaowei Cai Ph.D - In: Revista Tinerilor Economisti (The Young Economists Journal) 1 (2011) 17, pp. 150-161
This article studies the strategic interactions between cartelists and the antitrust agency in two theoretical game settings. In the simultaneous game, the numerical results show that it becomes harder for the firms to sustain collusion, but easier for the antitrust agency to detect collusion as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010819447
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The pro-collusive effect of increasing the repose period for price fixing agreements
Hinloopen, Jeroen - 2005
payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346460
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Vertical differentiation and collusion : cannibalization or proliferation?
Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold; Marini, Marco A.; Tarola, Ornella - 2016
In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451580
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Market power and cartel formation : theory and an empirical test
Filson, Darren; Keen, Edward; Fruits, Eric; … - 2000
Antitrust enforcement makes it difficult to test theories of cartel formation because most attempts to form cartels are … blocked. However, federal laws allow U.S. produce growers to operate marketing cartels through devices called marketing orders …. These cartels use quantity controls and quality standards to raise prices on fresh produce. Some growers have adopted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011568720
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Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets
Marini, Marco A. - 2017
This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660599