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Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation
Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - 2004
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324956
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Statistical tests of the demand for insurance : an "all or nothing" decision
Corcos, Anne; Pannequin, François; Montmarquette, Claude - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011610098
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Are emotions exacerbating the recency bias? : an experimental study
Rudiawarni, Felizia Arni; Narsa, I Made; Tjahjadi, Bambang - In: International journal of trade and global markets 13 (2020) 1, pp. 61-70
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012179346
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Expressiveness and robustness measures for the evaluation of an additive value function in multiple criteria preference disaggregation methods : an experimental analysis
Kadziński, Miłosz; Ghaderi, Mohammad; Wąsikowski, Jakub - In: Computers & operations research : and their … 87 (2017), pp. 146-164
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011743442
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Designing empirical experiments to compare interactive multiobjective optimization methods
Afsar, Bekir; Silvennoinen, Johanna; Misitano, Giovanni; … - In: Journal of the Operational Research Society 74 (2023) 11, pp. 2327-2338
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014446113
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POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION
GARRATT, ROD; PARCO, JAMES E.; QIN, CHENG-ZHONG; … - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 07 (2005) 04, pp. 407-429
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977746
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Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation
Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423048
Cover Image
Potential maximization and coalition government formation
Garratt, Rod; Parco, James E.; Qin, Cheng-zhong; … - 2004
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603116