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Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation
Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - 2004
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324956
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Leaving the market or reducing the coverage?
Corcos, Anne; Pannequin, François; Montmarquette, Claude - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011458751
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International tourism demand forecasting with machine learning models : the power of the number of lagged inputs
Bi, Jian-Wu; Han, Tian-Yu; Li, Hui - In: Tourism economics : the business and finance of tourism … 28 (2022) 3, pp. 621-645
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013267939
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Statistical tests of the demand for insurance : an "all or nothing" decision
Corcos, Anne; Pannequin, François; Montmarquette, Claude - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011610098
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Measuring individual risk-attitudes : an experimental comparison between Holt & Laury measure and an insurance-choices-based procedure
Corcos, Anne; Pannequin, François; Montmarquette, Claude - 2017 - Preliminary Version - December 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200268
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Leaving the market or reducing the coverage? : a model-based experimental analysis of the demand for insurance
Corcos, Anne; Pannequin, François; Montmarquette, Claude - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 20 (2017) 4, pp. 836-859
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781678
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POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION
GARRATT, ROD; PARCO, JAMES E.; QIN, CHENG-ZHONG; … - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 07 (2005) 04, pp. 407-429
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977746
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Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation
Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423048
Cover Image
Potential maximization and coalition government formation
Garratt, Rod; Parco, James E.; Qin, Cheng-zhong; … - 2004
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603116