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It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011808006
It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442390
suppliers. We also compare other common contests, in particular, fixed-prize tournaments and auctions. Like bonus tournaments …This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research …, auctions implement the socially optimal diversity, but usually with higher rents for the suppliers. Fixed-prize tournaments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410264
success function. Our framework includes Tullock contests, Lazear-Rosen tournaments and all-pay contests as special cases …We consider the design of contests for n agents when the principal can choose both the prize profile and the contest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012223823
the well being of others. In this paper we examine tournaments among inequity averse agents, who dislike disadvantageous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011415111
We study quantity and price competition in heterogeneous triopoly markets where two firms are commonly owned by institutional shareholders, whereas the third firm is owned by independent shareholders. With such a mixed ownership structure, the common owners have an incentive to coordinate their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013330969
We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771751
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012516459
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569200
A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly have outside owners.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359931