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auction is beneficial to the buyer compared to no communication and ex-ante communication. In a setting where the buyer and …In procurement auctions, bidders are usually better informed about technical, financial, or legal aspects of the goods … and services procured. Therefore, the buyer may include a dialogue in the procurement procedure which enables the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167341
This paper studies the role of communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement … auctions. Not only positive reputation ratings but also engaging in communication increases a bidder’s probability of winning … the auction. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014182497
This paper explores how a seller should transmit product information to bidders with horizontally differentiated preferences. Under cheap-talk, we show that, in an informative equilibrium, the seller provides less precise information for more popular product attributes. Second, for any given...
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We investigate how buyer-supplier communication affects procurement prices, comparing auctions without direct … communication to negotiations allowing it. In controlled experiments involving students and procurement professionals, we find … communication increases prices, disadvantaging buyers. Negotiation analyses show lower initial offers, negotiation-focused dialogue …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015455840
Does the type of post-auction feedback affect bidding behavior in first price auctions? Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007 …) find that such manipulation can increase bids in a one-shot auction. They explain this as an effect of anticipated regret … important market design issue using four different auction protocols and a large sample of subjects. We do not find any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014155460
Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...
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