Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 1,009
Cover Image
Endogenous Selection and Moral Hazard in Executive Compensation Contracts
Armstrong, Chris - 2012
The two major paradigmsin the theoretical agency literature aremoral hazard (i.e., hidden action)and adverseselection (i.e., hiddeninformation). Prior research typically solves these problemsin isolation, as opposed to simultaneouslyincorporating both adverseselection and moral hazard features....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116385
Cover Image
Worldwide executive compensation : how international companies set salaries, incentives, benefits
Business International Corporation - 1967
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000332963
Cover Image
Perverse incentives at the banks? : evidence from a natural experiment
Agarwal, Sumit; Wang, Faye H. - 2009 - Draft: August 20, 2009
Incentive provision is a central question in modern economic theory. During the run up to the financial crisis, many … banks attempted to encourage loan underwriting by giving out incentive packages to loan officers. Using a unique data set on … small business loan officer compensation from a major commercial bank, we test the model’s predictions that incentive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892598
Cover Image
Compensation and incentive
Baker, George P.; Jensen, Michael C.; Murphy, Kevin J. - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 43 (1988) 3, pp. 593-616
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003479787
Cover Image
Incentives in personnel economics
Lehmann, Stefanie Aniela - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009301501
Cover Image
Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value
Armstrong, Christopher; Vashishtha, Rahul - In: Journal of financial economics 104 (2012) 1, pp. 70-88
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009550151
Cover Image
Regulating deferred incentive pay
Hoffmann, Florian; Inderst, Roman; Opp, Marcus M. - 2015
Our paper evaluates recent regulatory proposals mandating the deferral of bonus payments and claw-back clauses in the financial sector. We study a broadly applicable principal agent setting, in which the agent exerts effort for an immediately observable task (acquisition) and a task for which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010518015
Cover Image
Gender differences in response to contingent rewards : evidence from a natural experiment of junior tennis
Anbarcı, Nejat; Arin, Kerim Peren; Lee, Jungmin - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 53 (2014), pp. 131-137
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010519743
Cover Image
The impact of family control on the top management compensation mix and incentive orientation
Chen, Chao-Jung; Hsu, Chung-Yuan; Chen, Yu-Lin - In: International review of economics & finance : IREF 32 (2014), pp. 29-46
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010531319
Cover Image
How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378949