We develop a structural industry equilibrium model to show how competitive CEO-firm matching and product markets jointly determine firm value and CEO pay. We analytically derive testable implications for the effects of product market characteristics on firm size, CEO pay, and CEO impact on firm...

We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownershipaffects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes varia-tion in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industryand intra-firm cross-market...

We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industry and intra-firm cross-market...

Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’s performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are...

Ensuring and maintaining staff competitiveness on the national and international level, the quantification of effective ways of enhancing competitive advantages of the national economy, are crucial strategies for socio-economic development of world countries. This article investigates the...

Using manager compensation disclosure and intra-family manager cooperation measures, we create indices of family-level competitive/cooperative incentives. Families that encourage cooperation among their managers are more likely to engage in coordinated behavior (e.g., cross-trading,...

Since the 2007-09 financial crisis, researchers have debated whether compensation plans drove excessive risk-taking or financial managers simply underestimated the risks of various investments. Through a principal-agent model with heterogeneous beliefs, we show that principals offer contracts...

This paper studies managerial short-termism by considering a model in which two firms compete for a new investment opportunity. It shows that under competition firms may deliberately induce short-termism by tying managerial pay to short-term stock prices. Due to information asymmetry between...

We develop a model to study the impact of corporate governance on firm investment decisions and industry competition. In the model, governance structure affects the distribution of shares among short- and long-term oriented investors, the robustness of the management regarding possible...

We study how competition for talent affects CEO compensation, taking into consideration that CEO decisions and CEO skills or talent are not observable, and CEOs can manipulate performance as measured by outsiders. Firms compete by offering contracts that generate rents for the CEO. We derive the...