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A theory of threshold contracts
Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013 - This version: August 2013
We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter … reappointment if the principal's utility is too low. We identify the circumstances under which such threshold contracts are welfare …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102
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Information and Market Power in DeFi Intermediation
Azar, Pablo D.; Casillas, Adrian; Farboodi, Maryam - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
This paper considers the "DeFi intermediation chain"--the market structure that underlies the creation and distribution of ETH, the native cryptocurrency of Ethereum--to examine how information asymmetry shapes intermediation rents. We argue that using proof-of-stake blockchain technology in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015072890
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A Theory of Threshold Contracts
Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013
We consider an infinitely repeated reappointment game in a principal-agent relationship. Typical examples are voter … reappointment if the principal's utility is too low. We identify the circumstances under which such threshold contracts are welfare …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014152779
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Optimal collateralized contracts
Cao, Dan Vu; Lagunoff, Roger D. - 2018
We examine the role of collateral in a dynamic model of optimal credit contracts in which a borrower values both housing and non-housing consumption. The borrower's private information about his income is the only friction. An optimal contract is collateralized when in some state, some portion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011919030
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Inefficiency and regulation in credence goods markets with altruistic experts
Farukh, Razi; Kerkhof, Anna; Loebbing, Jonas - 2020
We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181
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The provision of wage incentives : A structural estimation using contracts variation
D'Haultfœuille, Xavier; Février, Philippe - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 11 (2020) 1, pp. 349-397
We address empirically the issues of the optimality of simple linear compensation contracts and the importance of asymmetries between firms and workers. For that purpose, we consider contracts between the French National Institute of Statistics and Economics (Insee) and the interviewers it hired...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372
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Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2008
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343931
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A mechanism for Thawing the credit markets
Karni, Edi - 2009
This paper describes a mechanism designed to induce commercial banks to increase their willingness to extend loans in an economic environment characterized by increased uncertainty and diminished expectations. This mechanism is a new tool for the conduct of monetary policy to combat recessions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003836600
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Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2009
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003798182
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Contracting over commitment vs. flexibility under asymmetric information
Galperti, Simone - 2011 - Preliminary and Incomplete
We study a dynamic model of monopolistic provision of commitment devices to sophisticated, Strotzian decision makers …. We allow for unobservable heterogeneity at the contracting stage in the agents' preferences for commitment vs … of the induced balance between commitment and flexibility. -- Time inconsistency ; self-control ; commitment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008859687