On Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information
Year of publication: |
2017
|
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Authors: | Vasama, Suvi |
Publisher: |
[2017]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kreditrisiko | Credit risk | Kredit | Credit |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (27 p) |
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Series: | Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper ; No. 15/2017 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 4, 2017 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3013567 [DOI] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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