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On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
Atay, Ata; Solymosi, Tamás - 2018
-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011071
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On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
Atay, Ata; Solymosi, Tamás - In: Economics letters 167 (2018), pp. 99-103
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012015800
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The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2008
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325870
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On the impossibility of fair risk allocation
Csóka, Péter; Pintér, Miklós - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 16 (2016) 1, pp. 143-158
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431331
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The core of aggregative cooperative games with externalities
Stamatopoulos, Giorgos - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 16 (2016) 1, pp. 389-410
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431765
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The Shapley value for directed graph games
Chmelnitskaja, Anna B.; Selçuk, Özer; Talman, Dolf - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284534
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Step out - step in sequencing games
Musegaas, Marieke; Borm, Peter; Quant, Marieke - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285003
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Supermodular NTU-games
Koševoj, Gleb A.; Suzuki, Takamasa; Talman, Dolf - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285013
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The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2008
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377055
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Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2010
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381991