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Intuitive Solutions in Game Representations : The Shapley Value Revisited

Dubey, Pradeep K. - 2018

We show that any transferable utility game can be represented by an assignment of facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost of the facilities. The intuitive solution in the representation turns out to be the Shapley value of the game, and thus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012925101

On Solving Liability Problems

Groote Schaarsberg, Mirjam - 2013

This paper introduces liability problems, as a generalization of bankruptcy problems, where every agent not only owns a … want to cash their claims, we will analyze liability rules which prescribe how the total available amount of cash should be … schemes is established and it is seen that within the class of hierarchical liability problems, such a transfer scheme is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080617

The Roll Call Interpretation of the Shapley Value

Kurz, Sascha - 2018

The Shapley value is commonly illustrated by roll call votes in which players support or reject a proposal in sequence. If all sequences are equiprobable, a voter's Shapley value can be interpreted as the probability of being pivotal, i.e., to bring about the required majority or to make this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913266

New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment

Cheung, Stephen L. - 2011

This paper introduces new experimental designs to enrich understanding of conditional cooperation and punishment in public good games. The key to these methods is to elicit complete contribution or punishment profiles using the strategy method. It is found that the selfish bias in conditional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125147

Inequality, coalitions and collective action

Bardhan, Pranab K.; Singh, Nirvikar - 2004

In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011520520

Conditional cooperation in group contests

Kiss, Hubert János; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso; Zhukova, Vita - 2020

In this paper we show experimentally that conditional cooperation, a phenomenon described in the private provision of public goods, is also present in group contests, where participants’ contributions to their group performance partially determines if they overcome a rival group. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012439580

On the stability of cooperation structures

Haeringer, Guillaume - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001674579

Allocation rules for network games

Jackson, Matthew O. - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001788903

Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values

Brink, René van den; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2010

We generalize the null player property (satisfied by the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (satisfied by the equal division solution) to the so-called delta-reducing player property, stating that a delta-reducing player (being a player such that any coalition containing this player...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045005

The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games

Kim Hang Pham Do; Norde, Henk - 2011

Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature. For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways. In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199078