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Intuitive Solutions in Game Representations : The Shapley Value Revisited

Dubey, Pradeep K. - 2018

We show that any transferable utility game can be represented by an assignment of facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost of the facilities. The intuitive solution in the representation turns out to be the Shapley value of the game, and thus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012925101

On Solving Liability Problems

Groote Schaarsberg, Mirjam - 2013

This paper introduces liability problems, as a generalization of bankruptcy problems, where every agent not only owns a … want to cash their claims, we will analyze liability rules which prescribe how the total available amount of cash should be … schemes is established and it is seen that within the class of hierarchical liability problems, such a transfer scheme is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080617

The Roll Call Interpretation of the Shapley Value

Kurz, Sascha - 2018

The Shapley value is commonly illustrated by roll call votes in which players support or reject a proposal in sequence. If all sequences are equiprobable, a voter's Shapley value can be interpreted as the probability of being pivotal, i.e., to bring about the required majority or to make this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913266

Conditional cooperation in group contests

Kiss, Hubert János; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso; Zhukova, Vita - 2020

In this paper we show experimentally that conditional cooperation, a phenomenon described in the private provision of public goods, is also present in group contests, where participants’ contributions to their group performance partially determines if they overcome a rival group. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012439580

New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment

Cheung, Stephen L. - 2011

This paper introduces new experimental designs to enrich understanding of conditional cooperation and punishment in public good games. The key to these methods is to elicit complete contribution or punishment profiles using the strategy method. It is found that the selfish bias in conditional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125147

Inequality, coalitions and collective action

Bardhan, Pranab K.; Singh, Nirvikar - 2004

In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011520520

Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts : A Generalized Bidding Approach

Ju, Yuan - 2007

This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games. We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012731745

Hierarchical Invasion of Cooperation in Complex Networks

Vilone, Daniele - 2018

The emergence and survival of cooperation is one of the hardest problems still open in science. Several factors such as the existence of punishment, repeated interactions, topological effects and the formation of prestige may all contribute to explain the counter-intuitive prevalence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929847

Cooperative strategic games

Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287

A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games

van den Brink, René - 2012

In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013106856